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Farewell	Whitehall,	hello	Red	Square?	On	Gove	and
the	‘privilege	of	public	service’
In	a	recent	attempt	to	reset	the	political	agenda	as	the	UK	comes	out	of	lockdown,	Michael	Gove
gave	a	speech	focusing	on	Whitehall	reform.	Abby	Innes	outlines	the	similarities	between	the
government’s	promised	strategy	and	(failed)	attempts	to	transform	the	USSR.
On	the	face	of	it,	Michael	Gove’s	Ditchley	Annual	Lecture	is	a	shrewd	piece	of	politics.	It	sets	out
the	government’s	agenda	for	the	radical	reform	of	Whitehall	in	terms	designed	to	appeal	to	the
critical	liberal	centre.	The	guiding	light	is	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt.	The	guiding	mission	is	to	mend	the
social	contract	identified	as	broken	since	the	Global	Financial	Crisis.	The	closing	statement	is	that	Michael	Gove	is
in	politics	to	make	‘opportunity	more	equal’.
But	while	few	liberals	would	oppose	these	ends,	what	matters	here	are	the	means,	because	any	radical	overhaul	of
the	government’s	machinery	has	the	potential	to	make	or	break	it.	And	to	insist	that	you	are	in	politics	to	end
inequality	of	opportunity	is	to	tell	us	almost	nothing	substantive	at	all:	communists	and	economic	libertarians	share
this	goal	but	disagree	fairly	severely	as	to	how	to	go	about	it.
Read	on,	however,	and	you	discover	that	at	the	centre	of	this	strategy	is	a	category	error	of	fatal	proportions.	The
leading	principle	of	the	reform	is	that	‘government	needs	to	evaluate	data	more	rigorously’	and	to	do	this	it	needs	to
hire	more	mathematicians,	statisticians,	data	scientists	and	others	from	the	physical	sciences.	Why?	Because:
so	many	policy	and	implementation	decisions	depend	on	understanding	mathematical	reasoning.	That
means	we	need	to	reform	not	just	recruitment,	but	training.	We	need	to	ensure	more	policy	makers	and
decision	makers	feel	comfortable	discussing	the	Monte	Carlo	method	or	Bayesian	statistics,	more	of
those	in	Government	are	equipped	to	read	a	balance	sheet	and	discuss	what	constitutes	an	appropriate
return	on	investment,	more	are	conversant	with	the	commercial	practices	of	those	from	whom	we
procure	services	and	can	negotiate	the	right	contracts	and	enforce	them	appropriately.
Mathematics	is	presented	here	as	the	discipline	–	the	magical	craft	–	that	will	optimise	all	these	decisions	and
relationships	and	render	them	perfectly	efficient.	So	why	has	no-one	thought	of	this	before?
The	thing	is	they	have.	It	was	called	the	Union	of	Soviet	Socialist	Republics	and	it	collapsed	under	the	weight	of	its
own	internal	contradictions	in	1991.	The	state	that	historically	engaged	the	highest	proportion	of	engineers,
mathematicians,	data	analysts	and	cyberneticians	as	a	matter	of	reinventing	statecraft	was	the	USSR	from	1965	to
1969:	the	era	of	the	Kosygin	reforms	in	which	the	Soviets	tried	to	apply	mathematics	of	diverse	forms	to	solve	the
bureaucratic	rigidity,	information	failures,	and	chronic	dislocations	of	production	and	allocation	endemic	in	the
traditional	method	of	command	planning.
Like	Gove	and	his	long-time	partner	in	this	scheme,	Dominic	Cummings,	Soviet	cyberneticians	would	depict	the
governmental	system	as	an	object	of	technical	control,	with	inputs,	outputs,	and	feedback	loops:	the	language	of
machines.	The	post-Stalinist	recourse	to	mathematics	(and	extensive	conversations	with	Western	neoclassical
economists	and	operations	research	specialists)	gained	some	traction	around	the	optimisation	of	production,	input-
output	tables,	and	linear	optimisation	problems	within	single	enterprise	that	sought	to	improve	the	production	of
simple	and	notably	inanimate	products.	The	Soviets	also	solved	some	logistical	challenges	around	transport,	but
progress	stalled	every	time	they	confronted	the	problems	of	change.	They	failed	around	any	task	that	was
characterised	by	uncertainty,	complexity,	interdependence	and	evolution	i.e.	precisely	the	qualities	of	most	of	the
tasks	uploaded	to	the	modern	democratic	state.
The	emphasis	on	comprehensive	measurement	in	The	Privilege	of	Public	Service	is	positively	nostalgic.	Gove
declares	that	government	must	prove	that	money	is	well	spent,	that	improvements	must	be	measurable;	asks	for
‘hard,	testable	data’	on	how	each	policy	has	worked;	suggests	that	‘randomised	control	trials’	should	be	used	for
comparative	quality	control.	Last	but	not	least	he	argues	that	by	collecting	more	information,	data	analysts	will	learn
the	‘valuable	lessons	that	lie	buried	in	our	data’.	But	he	forgets	that	all	data	requires	interpretation	and	what	we
choose	to	measure	is	in	turn	a	reflection	of	how	we	interpret	the	world.	The	fabled	data	analyst	is	inescapably	like
Narcissus,	who,	confronted	with	a	pool	of	data	is	also	transfixed	by	their	own	reflection.
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The	government	should	pause	at	this	point	and	imagine	the	scale	of	bureaucratic	effort	required	to	map	not	just	the
financial	but	the	social	costs	and	benefits	of	every	governmental	act	via	‘hard,	testable	data’	as	Gove	recommends.
As	the	Soviet	economy	tried	to	move	beyond	war	planning	to	more	intensive	growth,	the	challenges	of	complexity
and	dynamism	had	exposed	the	informational	limits	on	the	existing	system	and	more	measurement	had	turned	out
to	be	exactly	the	wrong	answer.	The	Kosygin	reforms	hoped	to	solve	the	crippling	bureaucracy	that	had	arisen	from
the	all-encompassing	measurement	targets	increasingly	imposed	on	every	Soviet	enterprise	to	improve	their
efficiency.	By	the	mid-1960s,	Soviet	reformers	were	duly	advocating	for	greater	enterprise	discretion,	devolution	of
resources,	and	a	radical	reduction	in	output	targets.	Soviet	economic	performance	then	improved,	until	the	Prague
Spring	from	1967-1968	indicated	that	such	economic	reforms	would	beget	political	reform.
Why	had	targets	proved	so	damaging?	Because	financial	reward	had	followed	the	fulfilment	of	these	‘hard	and
testable’	targets,	enterprise	managers	were	rationally	incentivised	to	manage	what	had	quickly	become
contradictory	if	not	straightforwardly	impossible	targets	with	‘private	orders	of	importance’,	fulfilment	of	the	easiest,
cheapest	measures	at	the	expense	of	those	that	might	actually	be	more	critical	and,	eventually,	just	lying	outright
about	outputs	to	survive	in	their	posts.	(See	UK	public	sector	outsourcing	for	current	examples).	This	government
has	already	missed	every	target	it	has	declared	so	it	is	bemusing	to	hear	that	their	solution	is	a	strategy	abandoned
by	the	USSR	as	excessively	bureaucratic	before	Dominic	Cummings	was	born.
Even	with	simplified	targets	the	Soviets	were	still	unable	to	set	out	an	efficiently	centralised	system	of	output
planning	because	it	was	mathematically	impossible	to	determine	the	‘social	optimum’	that	would	form	the	basis	of
an	efficient	pricing	system	or	allow	them	to	determine	the	appropriate	architecture	of	decision-making	(or	in	Gove’s
terms	‘negotiate	‘the	right’	contracts’).	The	reason	they	could	not	do	this	was	fundamental:	to	know	what	was
optimal	and	inclusive	of	all	technological	potential	you	would	need	foreknowledge	–	a	godlike	capacity	to	know	the
future	of	all	needs	and	capacities	before	they	had	happened.	And	while	Stalin	–	and	Cummings	for	that	matter	–
had	insisted	that	‘man’	had	the	capacity	to	discover	the	predetermined	laws	of	history	it	turned	out	that	these	were
simply	what	the	Party	said	they	were.	This	is	otherwise	known	as	totalitarianism.	With	such	knowledge,	what	need
for	democracy?
What	Soviet	cyberneticians	discovered	is	that	the	fantasy	of	‘optimal	government’	is	a	metaphysical	space	required
to	be	both	timeless	and	telepathic.	A	pure	theory	of	optimal	government	may	be	defined	as	the	realization	of	a
system	in	which	all	decisions	are	made	by	the	governmental	units	and	the	decisions	those	units	take	are	exactly
those	made	by	a	perfectly	informed	central	authority.	The	Soviets	even	came	up	with	a	name	for	it:	they	called	it
‘perfect	indirect	centralization‘.	The	‘cycle’	of	the	entire	governmental	system	must	be	expressed	mathematically	so
that	the	disaggregated	behaviour	of	all	government	agents	operates	as	a	perfect	expression	of	what	the	centre
would	do	if	it	were	an	omniscient	planner,	just	without	the	central	planner	having	to	manage	all	the	information.
While	it	is	certainly	a	stimulating	mathematical	thought-experiment	it	turns	out	to	be	a	practical	strategy	for
government	in	the	way	that	Baron	Von	Munchhausen	pulling	himself	out	of	the	swamp	by	his	own	hair	is	a	practical
travel	plan.
Soviet	mathematicians	discovered	that	optimal	planning	was	mathematically	impossible	because	once	you
introduced	an	iota	of	dynamism	or	complexity	to	the	models	the	possibility	of	mathematical	coherence	collapsed
and	with	it	any	possibility	of	discovering	what	was	‘optimal’.	Further	theoretical	iterations,	mathematical	formulations
or	higher	computing	power	made	no	difference	because	the	problem	was	in	the	basic	interpretation	of	the	systemic
reality	as	‘closed’	i.e.	as	characterised	by	event	regularities	and	predetermined	laws	of	behaviour.
As	the	economist	and	mathematician	Tony	Lawson	has	pointed	out,	the	use	of	mathematics	as	such	brings	with	it	a
closed-system	ontology	of	the	political	economy.	Mathematics	as	a	mode	of	reasoning	rests	on	the	use	of
regularities	of	the	form	‘whenever	event	or	state	of	affairs	x,	then	event	or	state	of	affairs,	y‘,	and	hence	it
necessarily	involves	a	purely	functional	analysis.	Closed-system	thinking	in	turn	presupposes	an	ontology	of
isolated	atoms.	By	an	atom,	Lawson	doesn’t	mean	something	small,	but	something	that,	if	triggered,	has	its	own
separate,	independent,	and	invariable	effect,	whatever	the	context.	If	that	describes	you	then	splendid:	this	plan
should	fill	you	with	joy.
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Gove	talks	a	lot	about	how	important	it	is	to	have	innovation	and	deep	expertise	in	the	system,	but	the	fetish	for
mathematics	as	an	instrument	for	prediction	in	human	affairs	is	toxic	for	both.	Moreover,	if	the	fate	of	Cabinet
Secretary	Mark	Sedwill	is	anything	to	go	by	and	criticism	of	these	proposals	is	regarded	as	heresy,	then	the	main
impact	of	this	upheaval	will	be	to	strip	the	civil	service	of	competence	and	what	remains	of	its	already	shattered
morale,	another	historically	consistent	move.	The	Communist	Party’s	tendency	to	purge	informed	criticism	built
avoidable	ignorance	into	the	system	and	contributed	to	its	ultimate	overthrow.
A	closed-system	ontology	of	government	is	a	profound	category	error.	As	philosophers	of	knowledge	will	point	out
we	live	with	inalienable	sources	of	radical	uncertainty.	The	first	is	epistemological	uncertainty:	the	fact	that	there	is
no	Archimedean	point	where	we	can	stand	to	observe	and	understand	the	entire	universe	of	causal	mechanisms
that	lead	us	to	a	given	situation.	Second,	ontological	indeterminacy:	the	fact	that	every	time	someone	has	a	new
idea	or	there	is	emergent	novelty	in	complex	systems,	the	past	becomes	a	less	informative	shadow	of	the	future.
This	is	the	human	condition.	Examples	of	radical	uncertainty	problems	that	currently	confront	the	state	are	the
timing	and	magnitude	of	climate	change	tipping	points	and	COVID-19.	Thus,	a	theory	based	on	past	observations
of	regularities	won’t	hack	it.	It	seems	that	neither	Gove	nor	Cummings	understand	the	distinction	between
calculable	risk	and	radical	uncertainty.	Whatever	they	do	after	politics	they	should	not	go	into	insurance.
The	Global	Financial	Crisis	was	a	devastating	proof	that	state	agencies	and	corporations	are	inescapably	run	by
people	who	operate	with	less	than	complete	information:	that	is	to	say,	people	who	live	in	a	social	as	distinct	from	a
machine	world.	Indeed,	they	are	people	who	typically	spend	their	working	lives	trying	to	reconcile	a	complex,
frequently	conflicting	and	ever-changing	set	of	socio-economic	needs	and	interests.	Hence	it	simply	will	not	wash	to
say	of	these	Soviet	lessons	‘but	that	was	then,	and	this	is	now’.	The	Soviets	tried	to	solve	optimisation	of	a	closed-
system	mathematically	within	almost	entirely	centrally	planned	economy	under	a	system	of	totalitarian	control	and
they	failed;	how	much	more	will	Cummings	fail	in	the	dynamic	complex	world	of	the	democratic	capitalist	political
economy?	And	how	much	personal	data	is	the	government	going	to	share	with	unaccountable	technology
companies	in	the	process?
Far	from	being	new,	these	proposals	are	arguably	the	logical	end	point	of	the	New	Public	Management	reforms
begun	by	Margaret	Thatcher	in	1979	and	continued	in	barely	mitigated	form	by	New	Labour.	The	fact	is	the	affinities
between	the	economic	libertarianism	of	the	last	forty	years	and	Leninism	are	rooted	in	their	common	dependence
on	a	closed-system,	machine	model	of	the	political	economy.	The	neoclassical	economics	on	which	neoliberalism
depends	is	unique	in	the	history	of	economic	ideas	precisely	for	its	dependence	on	mathematics.	It	is	this	shared
dependence	on	a	closed	system	theorising	that	explains	why,	when	it	comes	to	the	mechanics	of	government,
Soviet	central	planning	and	neoliberalism	justify	a	near	identical	methodology	of	output	planning,	quantification,
forecasting	and	target	setting:	techniques	that	only	make	sense	in	a	closed-system,	machine	‘world’.
In	terms	of	historical	parallels	therefore,	this	means	that	the	Conservative	government	has	just	reached	the	period
where	it	despairs	of	the	increasingly	crude	output	planning	employed	since	Thatcher	and	its	rigidifying	effects	on
administration	and	prays,	like	the	Soviets	in	the	1960s,	that	mathematics	will	open	an	intellectual	escape	hatch	out
of	the	almighty	systemic	mess	its	doctrinaire	predecessors	have	already	induced.	The	Privilege	of	Public	Service
opens	with	a	quote	from	Antonio	Gramsci,	but	it	is	Lenin	who	haunts	this	project,	opposed	by	Gramsci	insofar	as	he
insisted	on	reading	Marx	as	a	determinist.	I	wait	with	awful	fascination	the	moment	when	the	parliamentary
Conservative	Party	realises	it	is	about	to	squander	the	last	vestige	of	its	practical	Burkean	heritage	to	become	a	re-
enactment	society	for	the	most	bureaucratic	regime	in	human	history	only	now	with	more	blatant	financial
corruption.
And	we	should	ask	this:	is	there	anybody	in	this	government	who	understands	the	gravity	of	this	folly?	A
dependency	on	mathematics	in	policymaking	and	hence	the	necessity	of	closed-system	thinking	about	government
requires	that	the	past	is	an	exact	statistical	mirror	of	the	future.	But	the	parameters	of	the	political	economy	are
being	changed	every	day	by	climate	change.	To	reverse	this	impending	catastrophe	we	need	systems	of
government	that	place	the	precautionary	principle	and	the	vitality	of	the	biosphere	at	their	core,	and	we	need	them
urgently.	A	plurality	of	approaches	is	certainly	necessary	and	indeterminate	modelling	and	the	a	posteriori	search
for	patterns	within	data	will	all	be	valuable;	but	there	is	zero	recognition	of	the	provisional	and	adjunct	nature	of
these	techniques	here.	So	which	version	of	reality	does	the	parliamentary	Conservative	Party	now	believe	in,	and
does	it	have	any	conception	of	how	much	is	riding	on	its	decision?	Is	it	really	going	to	leave	this	to	Dominic
Cummings?	An	unaccountable	advisor	with	a	fixation	for	a	discipline	he	doesn’t	understand?	God	help	us	if	the
answer	to	that	is	‘yes’.
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